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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
AGNES LUNDBERG, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Case 
vs. No. 9212 
LEGRAND BACKMAN, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
Appellant in her petition for rehearing and brief in 
support thereof says the court has erred in sustaining the order 
of the lower court in it's granting a summary judgment in 
favor of respondent an~ against appellant, this because as ap-
11 d#1 eYe 1..5 • • f f h h pe ant conten sAa genuine Issue o act as to w et er or not 
respondent had terminated the relationship of attorney and 
client. It is evident however, that a trial would not produce 
evidence which is not already before the court as to such issue. 
We cannot understand how a termination of a relationship 
which is not even asserted to have been established could come 
about unless the law (not facts) establishes such relationship. 
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In this case appellant has at no time either in her plead-
ing or in her affidavits either alleged or contended that there 
was ever an agreement between appellant and respondent 
under which respondent would represent appellant beyond 
the trial of the case in the lower court. Therefore if there 
was an obligation as is contended by appellant it would be be-
cause the law imposes that obligation on respondent if this 
was the law. But this court has held that there is no obligation 
for an attorney to carry on defendant's case beyond the final 
judgment without an agreement to do so. Appellant further 
contends that the issue is not whether respondent was employ-
ed to appeal appellant's case but the issue is whether respond-
ent violated his obligation as an attorney in exercising care in 
the performance of his duties. This too is a question of law 
which the court must determine from the facts before it, the 
pleadings and affidavits. We cannot see how without ap-
pellant having pleaded that such obligation existed she could 
produce evidence to prove that which appellant has not plead-
ed. 
Counsel for appellant argues that not once did respondent 
ever advise appellant that he considered their relationship 
terminated. That statement is not true and the record will 
not bear out such statement. The record shows that appellant 
in her own affidavit stated that she contacted attorney John 
H. Stone of this city who advised her he was unable to perfect 
an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court until respondent ex-
ecuted and filed a withdrawal from the case; that appellant 
contacted respondent and was advised by him that he ha4 
withdrawn and this information was again relayed to Mr. 
Stone. 
It is to be noted that appellant does not say that she was 
advised the respodent would withdraw but that he had with-
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drawn. Again respondent in his deposition testified that 
within a few days after the trial of the case out of which this 
action arose he told appellant he would not serve her any more 
because of the attitude appellant had taken. toward respondent. 
Justice Crockett in his dissenting opinion states that the 
evidence which the court must presume is that respondent did 
not make it known to appellant that he would not represent 
appellant in proceedings subsequent to the entry of judgment. 
It is most difficult to follow the reasoning of Justice Crockett 
when appellant admits that she was advised that respondent 
had withdrawn from the case. And again as Justice Crockett 
quotes from appellant's second affidavit it is evident that 
appellant was told by respondent that he had withdrawn from 
the case. True appellant goes on and avers that Mr. Back-
man had not in fact done so, but that does not make a con-
tradiction or a dispute when appellant admits she was told 
respondent had withdrawn. We contend that in summary judg-
ment proceedings the parties are bound by their ad~issions. 
Then too it is evident from appellant's affidavit that ap-
pellant not only had time to perfect an appeal, but did contact 
ot}l~r cou~sel rf:?garding an appeal within the appeal period 
all of which goes. to show that appellant knew that respondent 
would not represent appellant after the case had been decided 
in the lower court. 
Justice Crockett says respondent filed a motion for a new 
trial on appellant's behalf which was filed too late; and did 
the same thing with respect to the filing of a belated notice 
of appeal on her behalf. No notice of appeal was ever filed 
by respondent. 
It seems from Justice Crockett's dissenting opinion that 
because both appellant and respondent thought the lower court 
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erred in it's decision, some duty rested upon respondent to 
follow the case through even though there was no allegation 
of an agreement. It is not unusual, but on the contrary usual 
for attorneys in losing a case to not agree with the court and 
to conclude that the court erred. 
The only thing shown in this case is that respondent 
did without any obligation on his part file a motion for 
new trial after the time had expired but before the ap-
peal period had expired, and respondent filed a withdrawal, 
which was not required under our rules, after the appeal 
period had expired. Appellant could not have been misled 
by respondent's having filed a belated motion for new trial 
because she avers that she had no knowledge of respond-
ent's having filed the same. 
Because other counsel told appellant they could not 
represent her until respondent filed a formal withdrawal 
when that was not the law, does not give rise to an action on 
behalf of appellant against respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no genuine issue for a court or jury to decide 
in this case and respondent should not be pl~ced in the 
embarrassing position in which he would find himself if 
compelled to defend such a case at a trial and especially 
risk a decision by a jury where there is no more evidence of 
a cause of action than is shown in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M. V. BACKMAN, 
Attorney for respondent 
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